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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a time when the nation’s water agencies and developers have 
gone to great lengths to “tap and reroute water to quench the thirst 
of expanding suburban communities,” an interesting question has 
surfaced.1  Is the discharge of a pollutant from a canal through a 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2006, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 2003, 
Providence College. 
 1 Felicity Barringer, Water Pump Case Tests Federal Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2004, 
at A1. 
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pumping station into a “navigable water,”2 such as a wetland,3 like 
taking a spoonful of soup from one bowl and passing it into another; 
or is such a discharge as “[i]f one takes a ladle of soup from a pot, 
lifts it above the pot, and pours it back into the pot, [without having] 
‘added’ soup or anything else to the pot?”4  In March of 2004, the 
United States Supreme Court decided South Florida Water Management 
District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians,5 holding that the federal Clean 
Water Act (“CWA”) and its permitting requirements6 apply to point 
sources that do not themselves generate pollutants.7  The Court, 
however, declined to answer whether the engineered movement of 
water from one “navigable water” to another requires compliance 
with the CWA.8  The Court stated that a permit under the CWA is not 
necessary when a pollutant from one body of water is added to 
another body of water that is not “meaningfully distinct” from the 
first.9  The question of what constitutes “meaningfully distinct” was 
left open for remand,10 and the various circuits will inevitably have to 
develop their own definitions in order to determine whether or not 
certain water diversion facilities are subject to the permitting 
regulations of the CWA. 
Miccosukee involved a canal which pumped polluted water into a 
natural wetland.11  The Supreme Court remanded the case for 
further development of the Government’s “unitary waters” theory.12  
According to this theory, all “navigable waters” of the United States 
 2 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000) (defining “navigable waters” as “the waters of the 
United States”). 
 3 A “wetland” may fall within the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act.  See United 
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 124 (1985) (concluding that a 
definition of “waters of the United States” includes wetlands adjacent to other bodies 
of water). 
The term “wetlands” means those areas that are inundated or saturated 
by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to 
support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a 
prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil 
conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and 
similar areas. 
Id. (citing 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1978)). 
 4 Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. New York, 273 F.3d 
481, 492 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 5 541 U.S. 95 (2004). 
 6 See infra notes 38–47 and accompanying text. 
 7 Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 105. 
 8 Id. at 112.  
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. at 99–100. 
 12 Id. at 104–12. 
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should be viewed unitarily and, therefore, a CWA permit would not 
be required when “one navigable water body is discharged, unaltered, 
into another navigable water body.”13  If courts accept this theory, 
“meaningfully distinct” waters will not exist and water diversion 
facilities will not likely be subject to the CWA permitting mandates.  
There is considerable precedent, however, which may establish that 
the “unitary waters” theory is incorrect.14
If courts find that water diversion facilities do, in fact, connect 
“meaningfully distinct” bodies of water, activities never before 
regulated by the CWA could be subject to permitting requirements.15  
Suppliers of drinking water,16 agricultural irrigation districts,17 and 
mineral extraction operations18 may be among the many required to 
obtain permits under the CWA.  This may result in disruptions to 
their operations, as well as permitting and treatment costs in the 
 13 Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 104. 
 14 See, e.g., Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1299 (1st Cir. 1996) 
(holding that the transfer of water from a river through snow-making pipes to a 
pond, which resulted in the transfer of pollutants, required a National Pollution 
Discharge Elimination System permit because the river and pond were two distinct 
“waters of the United States”); Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 481 (holding that New 
York City’s use of a tunnel to transfer drinking water from a reservoir into a creek 
triggered the Clean Water Act’s permit requirements); N. Plains Res. Council v. Fid. 
Exploration and Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The requirement 
that the physical, biological, or chemical integrity of the water be a ‘man-induced’ 
alteration refers to the effect of the discharge on the receiving water; it does not 
require that the discharged water be altered by man.”); Borden Ranch P’ship v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d, 527 U.S. 99 (2002) 
(holding that a pollutant is “added” into wetlands through the process of deep 
ripping  where the “soil [is] wrenched up, moved around, and redeposited”). 
 15 Richard Davis & Brian Doster, South Florida Water Management District v. 
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians: Supreme Court Considers Extending Clean Water Act Regulation, 
35 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 91, 92 (Jan. 9, 2004) [hereinafter Davis & Doster]. 
The court’s decision of the Miccosukee case has the potential to extend 
the reach of the Clean Water Act to activities and industries historically 
exempt from regulation under that statute.  Moreover, by its decision 
of the case, the court could restructure legal responsibilities and 
economic relationships in ways that could scarcely have been 
contemplated by the framers of the act. 
Id. 
 16 “Suppliers of drinking water . . . often move water from basins in which it is 
plentiful to basins in which need exceeds supply.”  Id. at 91–92. 
 17 “[A]gricultural irrigation districts frequently move water from basin to basin to 
allow productive use of fertile but arid lands.”  Id.  Furthermore, Congress has 
exempted “agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated 
agriculture” from the definition of “point source.”  33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000). 
 18 See Davis & Doster, supra note 15, at 91. 
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hundreds of millions of dollars.19  Costs could be passed on to 
farmers and ranchers who will either have to increase their own costs 
and lose competitiveness, or move away from certain practices and 
products altogether.20  A more regulated permitting requirement for 
water diversion facilities would also raise issues of federalism and the 
powers of the states to regulate their own environmental laws.21  It 
may be argued that such permitting requirements interfere with the 
states’ sovereign prerogatives to manage their own water resources 
and meet the interests and needs of their own citizens.22
These controversies all revolve around the fundamental issue of 
whether or not a water diversion facility connects two bodies of water 
that are “meaningfully distinct.”  It appears that the only argument 
which may save these facilities from permitting requirements under 
the CWA is the “unitary waters” theory raised in Miccosukee.23  Unless 
courts favor strong public policy arguments, however, or unless 
Congress decides to expressly exempt water diversion facilities from 
the permitting requirements,24 it is likely that these facilities will have 
 19 Id. at 92. 
The additional costs of compliance with the Clean Water Act will have 
to be absorbed somewhere—whether they are borne by those who 
move water from one watershed to another, passed back upstream to 
the sources of the pollutants, or passed forward to end-users of the 
water.  Regardless, the movement of these costs through the nation’s 
economy can be expected to result in changes, both foreseen and 
unforeseeable, that restructure economic relationships at the most 
fundamental level. 
Id. 
 20 See id. at 97. 
 21 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2000). 
 22 See id. § 1370. 
 23 The “unitary waters” theory may also potentially impact decisions that have 
held hydroelectric or dam facilities not subject to CWA permitting requirements 
because they do not add pollutants to a waterway.  See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. 
Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 590 (6th Cir. 1988); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. 
Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 24 Even when the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) was faced with 
issuing “millions of applications” and argued that Congress “could not have intended 
to impose such burdens,” it was held that the EPA Administrator does not have the 
authority to exempt any categories of “point sources” from permit requirements.  
NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1977).  Therefore, the court could 
not acquiesce to the Agency’s sympathetic pleas, concluding that only Congress 
could create such exemptions.  Id.  (“This is a proper task for the Legislature where 
the public interest may be considered from the multifaceted points of view of the 
representational process.”). 
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to spend millions of dollars to comply with the CWA, leaving both 
urban and rural communities to suffer the consequences.25
This Comment will explore how a court may define 
“meaningfully distinct” in light of the “unitary waters” theory posited 
by the Government in Miccosukee.  It will also discuss the 
consequences of subjecting water diversion facilities to the strict 
permitting requirements of the CWA.  Part II will provide an overview 
of the central issues of Miccosukee,26 while Part III will 
comprehensively analyze the “unitary waters” theory, as well as the 
arguments against it.27  Part IV will consider the many consequences 
of imposing permitting requirements on water diversion facilities, 
should the “unitary waters” theory be rejected.28  Part V will look to 
whether such permitting requirements will undermine essential 
aspects of the CWA, including the agricultural exemption and 
sovereign powers of the states.29  Finally, Part VI will attempt to 
explore the next logical steps and possible resolution to the queries 
raised in Miccosukee.30
II. DIVERTING THE ISSUES IN MICCOSUKEE 
A. The Clean Water Act 
A brief overview of the CWA is essential to fully understand the 
significant issues and arguments raised in Miccosukee.  In 1972, 
Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, now 
known, along with its amendments, as the CWA.  The CWA’s purpose 
 25 Drew Douglas, Environment: Requiring Permit for Everglades Pumping May Slow 
Restoration, Solicitor General Says, DAILY RPT. FOR EXECUTIVES: REG. & LAW (BNA), No. 
178, at A-26 (Sept. 15, 2003).  As stated by Nicolas Gutierrez, the District’s chairman: 
We’re already well on the way to cleaning up the Everglades.  Yet 
today’s progress could be diverted—or even reversed—if the law is 
wrongly applied, and if new procedures are added to existing 
regulations. Unless the lower court’s misreading of the law is 
overturned, there will be serious national consequences for the 
environment and the economy. . . . If we win this case, the real winner 
will be our nation’s environment, which will enjoy a faster and more 
effective cleanup.  But if we lose this case, the real losers will be the 
nation’s taxpayers, who will see their scarce resources frittered away on 
needless bureaucratic paperwork instead of practical measures that 
protect our environment. 
Id. 
 26 See infra Part II. 
 27 See infra Part III. 
 28 See infra Part IV. 
 29 See infra Part V. 
 30 See infra Part VI. 
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is to respond, comprehensively, as a matter of national policy, to the 
complex problem of restoring and maintaining the “chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”31  The CWA 
generally prohibits the discharge of any pollutant by any person into 
certain waters and “effectively creates a five-part jurisdictional test: Is 
there (1) an addition (2) of a pollutant (3) to the navigable waters 
(4) from a point source (5) by a person?”32  One of the most 
challenging aspects of the CWA is understanding its many 
definitional complexities, yet this must be overcome in order to apply 
the CWA to particular circumstances. 
The CWA defines “pollutant” as “dredged spoil, solid waste, 
incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, 
chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, 
wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and 
industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water.”33  
The phrase “discharge of a pollutant” is defined as “any addition of 
any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”34  
Furthermore, the CWA defines “navigable waters” as “the waters of 
the United States.”35
The CWA distinguishes between point sources and non-point 
sources.  A “point source” is “any discernable, confined and discrete 
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, 
tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, 
concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating 
craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.”36  Congress 
determined that federally mandated permitting programs are 
appropriate responses for addressing the addition of pollutants to the 
waters of the United States from “point sources” but that tailored 
state regulations are more appropriate for non-point sources.37  
 31 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000).  Though the CWA establishes an important role for 
the federal government, it also recognizes the primary responsibilities of the 
individual states to protect water quality and to manage water resources, including 
“the authority of each State to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction.”  Id. 
§ 1251(b), (g). 
 32 Robin Kundis Craig, Beyond SWANCC: The New Federalism and Clean Water Act 
Jurisdiction, 33 ENVTL. L. 113, 115 (2003). 
 33 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2000). 
 34 Id. § 1362(12). 
 35 Id. § 1362(7). 
 36 Id. § 1362(14). 
 37 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5, 
Miccosukee, 541 U.S. 95 (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22137034.  “Congress recognized that 
a wide variety of human and nonhuman activities affect water quality and that the 
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Therefore, the CWA merely encourages states to develop local 
programs to control the non-point sources of pollution.38
Section 402 of the CWA creates the National Pollution Discharge 
Elimination System (“NPDES”) Program.39  According to Section 402, 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) or a qualifying 
state agency can issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, or 
combination of pollutants, upon condition that such discharge will 
meet specified requirements.40  The NPDES program imposes 
limitations on a point source discharge by establishing a variety of 
requirements, including: technology-based effluent limitations,41 
water-quality-based effluent limitations,42 water quality standards,43 
national standards of performance for new point sources,44 effluent 
standards for toxic pollutants,45 pretreatment effluent limitations for 
point sources that discharge into publicly owned treatment works 
(“POTWs”),46 record-keeping and reporting requirements,47 and 
ocean discharge criteria.48
The CWA has been criticized by many since its enactment.  
Some argue that its “command-and-control approaches . . . are simply 
old-fashioned—expensive, inefficient, and rigid relics of the big-
government’s response to water pollution must be tailored to the nature of the 
activity and the severity of threat.”  Id. 
 38 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2)(F) (2000) (encouraging a process “to (i) 
identify, if appropriate, agriculturally and silviculturally related nonpoint sources of 
pollution, including return flows from irrigated agriculture, and their cumulative 
effects, runoff from manure disposal areas, and from land used for livestock and 
crop production, and (ii) set forth procedures and methods (including land use 
requirements) to control to the extent feasible such sources); id. § 1314(f) 
(describing the “[i]dentification and evaluation of nonpoint sources of pollution; 
processes, procedures, and methods to control pollution”); id. § 1329 (illustrating 
non-point source management programs). 
 39 Id. § 1342.  Cf. id. § 1344 (granting the Army Corps of Engineers the authority 
to issue “Section 404” permits “for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the 
navigable waters at specified disposal sites”). 
 40 Id. § 1342(a)(1). 
 41 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (2000).  Technology-based effluent limitations are 
restrictions on “quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, 
and other constituents.”  Id. § 1362(11). 
 42 Id. § 1312(a).  Water-quality-based effluent limitations are set when technology-
based effluent limitations are inadequate to meet the water quality standards set by 
the state.  Id. § 1313(a). 
 43 Id. § 1313(c)(2). 
 44 Id. § 1316. 
 45 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a) (2000). 
 46 Id. § 1317(b). 
 47 Id. § 1318. 
 48 Id. § 1343. 
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government past.”49  Others disapprove of “the expansive role given 
to the federal government.”50  The debates are ongoing, and have 
pitted the hopeful aspirations of the environmental community 
against the independent liberties of the regulated community. 
B. The Central and South Florida Flood Control Project 
In between South Florida’s coastal hills and the Everglades lies a 
“vast array of levees, canals, pumps, and water impoundment areas” 
known as the Central and South Florida Flood Control Project 
(“Project”).51  By altering the hydrology of the Everglades and 
changing the natural flow of ground and surface water, the Project 
sought to ensure flood protection, water conservation, and 
drainage.52  The South Florida Water Management District 
(“District”) operates the Project, in particular, a canal called “C-11,” a 
pump station known as “S-9,” an undeveloped wetland area called 
“WCA-3,” and two levees referred to as “L-33” and “L-37.”53 These are 
the five essential elements of the Project at issue in Miccosukee.54
 49 William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today—Has the Clean Water Act Been a 
Success?, 55 ALA. L. REV. 537, 539 (2004). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 99.  Florida had built several canals in the early 1900s to 
drain the wetlands and make them suitable for cultivation; instead, the canals 
lowered the water table, allowed salt water to intrude upon coastal wells, and could 
not control flooding.  Id. at 99–100.  In 1948, Congress responded to these problems 
by establishing the Project.  Id. 
 52 Id. 
Freshwater systems have been altered since historical times; however, 
the pace of change accelerated markedly in the early 20th century.  
Rivers and lakes have been modified by altering waterways, draining 
wetlands, constructing dams and irrigation channels, and establishing 
connections between water basins, such as canals and pipelines, to 
transfer water.  Although these changes have brought increased farm 
output, flood control, and hydropower, they have also radically 
changed the natural hydrological cycle in most of the world’s water 
basins. 
World Resources Institute, A Guide to World Resources 2000-2001: People and Ecosystems: 
The Fraying Web of Life, at 103 (2001), available at http://pdf.wri.org/wr2000_ 
chapter2_full.pdf. 
The devastating, if not fully intended, consequences of the . . . Project's 
operation over the intervening fifty years have included widespread 
destruction of the natural Everglades system.  The Everglades now 
occupy less than half the area of its historic pre-drainage wetland, and 
the remaining half of the natural system shows symptoms of serious 
ecological decline. 
Mary Doyle & Donald Jodrey, Everglades Restoration: Forging New Law in Allocating 
Water Environment, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 255, 260 (2002). 
 53 Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 100–01. 
 54 Id. 
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C-11 collects groundwater and rainwater from urban, 
agricultural, and residential areas, and as the water level rises above a 
certain level, the S-9 pumps water out of the canal and into WCA-3.55  
L-33 and L-37 slow down return flow by holding back the surface 
waters of WCA-3.56  The effect is “to artificially separate the C-11 basin 
from WCA-3; left to nature, the two areas would be a single wetland 
covered in an undifferentiated body of surface and ground water 
flowing slowly southward.”57
Problems arise when rainwater, falling on the agricultural, 
urban, and residential land, absorbs contaminants produced by 
human activities before entering into the C-11 canal.58  The C-11 
water, consequently, contains high levels of phosphorous, which is 
found in fertilizers used by farmers.59  This water is then pumped 
across the levees into WCA-3, altering the balance of its ecosystem 
and stimulating the growth of algae and plants foreign to the 
Everglades ecosystem.60  Since the plants and animals native to the 
Everglades have adapted to the very low phosphorous conditions, any 
phosphorous enrichment in the area can cause impacts such as “loss 
of water column dissolved oxygen, loss of native plant life 
(periphyton (micro-algae) and macrophytes), and loss of preferred 
foraging habitat for wading birds.”61
C. The Clean Water Act Claims 
The Miccosukee Tribe of Indians and the Friends of the 
Everglades brought a citizens’ suit against the District, claiming that 
 55 Id.  WCA-3 used to be part of the original South Florida Everglades and is now 
considered a water conservation area.  Id.  “The District impounds water in these 
areas to conserve fresh water that might otherwise flow directly to the ocean, and to 
preserve wetlands habitat.”  Id. 
 56 Id. at 101. 
 57 Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 101. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Memorandum from Dan Scheidt, Senior Scientist of the South Florida 
Initiative, to the Director of the Water Management Division 4 (May 20, 1999), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/region4/southflorida/miccosukee/memo1.pdf.  
The Florida Legislature attempted to remedy these problems by passing the 
Everglades Forever Act (“EFA”) in 1994, after the federal government sued the 
Florida Department of Environmental Regulation and the South Florida Water 
Management District.  See FLA. STAT. § 373.4592 (1994); United States v. S. Fla. Water 
Mgmt. Dist., 847 F. Supp. 1567, 1569 (S.D. Fla. 1992).  The EFA required the 
building of Storm Water Treatment Areas on the southern border of the Everglades 
Agricultural Area (“EAA”) to absorb phosphorous-containing waters from flowing 
directly from the EAA into the Everglades.  See FLA. STAT. § 373.4592 (2002). 
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the District could not operate the S-9 pump without an NPDES 
permit under Section 402 of the Clean Water Act because the pump 
station moved phosphorous-laden water from C-11 into WCA-3.62  
Arguing that this conveyance was the “discharge of a pollutant” from 
“any point source,” the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the operation of S-9 
and, therefore, the conveyance of water from C-11 into WCA-3.63  The 
district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, 
concluding that C-11 waters and the Everglades were “two separate 
bodies of water because the transfer of water or its contents from C-
11 into the Everglades would not occur naturally.”64
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion 
that pollutants were indeed being added to WCA-3.65  The District 
argued that a point source must add pollutants from the outside 
world in order for there to be an addition of a pollutant.66  
Nevertheless, the court considered whether, “but for the point 
source,” the pollutants would have been added to the Everglades.67  
Believing that C-11 water would not flow into WCA-3 without the S-9 
pump station, the Eleventh Circuit held that as the cause-in-fact of 
the addition of pollutants, the S-9 pump station required an NPDES 
permit.68  Although determining that a permit was required, the 
Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment awarding an 
injunction.69  The court recognized that an injunction would result in 
the cessation of the S-9 pump, causing substantial flooding and the 
 62 Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 102.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000) (citizen suit provision).  
The Miccosukee Tribe of Indians has been quite active in the battle to decrease the 
amount of phosphorous in the Everglades.  See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, Final 
Admin. Order (DOAH, 2004) (No. 03-2872RP), available at http://www.doah.state. 
fl.us/ros/2003/03%2D2872%2Epdf.  In July 2003, Florida’s Environmental 
Regulation Committee (“ERC”) issued a ruling, adopting a default standard of ten 
parts per billion for phosphorous and incorporating certain testing criteria and 
moderating provisions.  Id.  The Miccosukee Indians immediately brought an 
administrative challenge, claiming that the Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection exceeded its authority and calling into question most of the testing 
criteria.  Id. 
 63 Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 103. 
 64 Id. (quoting Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28a–29a, Miccosukee, 
541 U.S. 95 (No. 02-626)). 
 65 Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d 1364, 1368 
(11th Cir. 2002). 
 66 Id. at 1367.  (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 175 (D.C. 
Cir. 1982) (giving deference to EPA’s interpretation that “[an] addition from a point 
source occurs only if the point source itself physically introduces a pollutant into 
water from the outside world”)). 
 67 Id. at 1368. 
 68 Id. at 1369. 
 69 Id. at 1371. 
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displacement of many people.70  In light of these “disastrous 
consequences,” the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court 
should order the District to obtain an NPDES permit within a 
reasonable period of time.71  If the District failed to comply with this 
order, the plaintiffs could then rely on the “various enforcement 
mechanisms available under the CWA, such as fines and criminal 
penalties.”72
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and first 
considered whether the pumping of water by the District, which 
added nothing to the water being pumped, constituted an “addition” 
of a pollutant from a point source, thereby triggering the need for an 
NPDES permit.73  The District argued that a point source only 
requires an NPDES permit “when a pollutant originates from the 
point source,” not when it merely passes through the point source.74  
Writing for a nearly unanimous Court, Justice O’Connor rejected the 
District’s argument as “untenable” and held that “a point source need 
not be the original source of the pollutant; it need only convey the 
pollutant to ‘navigable waters.’”75
While holding that the definition of “discharge of a pollutant” 
included within its reach “point sources that do not themselves 
generate pollutants,” the Court, nevertheless, remanded the case and 
allowed for the development of an argument which was not 
previously raised before the Eleventh Circuit.76  The Government’s 
“unitary waters” argument views all “navigable waters” unitarily for 
purposes of NPDES requirements, and focuses on the definition of a 
pollutant discharge as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable 
waters from any point source.”77  According to the Government, the 
absence of the word “any” prior to the phrase “navigable waters” 
indicates “Congress’ understanding that NPDES permits would not 
be required for pollution caused by the engineered transfer of one 
 70 Id. at 1369. 
 71 Miccosukee, 280 F.3d at 1370–71. 
 72 Id. at 1371.  See also 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2000).  Violations carry fines of up to 
$100,000 per day and six years imprisonment.  Id. § 1319(c)(2). 
 73 Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 104. 
 74 Brief for Petitioner at 20, Miccosukee, 541 U.S. 95 (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 
22137015. 
 75 Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 105. 
 76 Id. at 112. 
 77 Id. at 105; 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2000). 
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‘navigable water’ to another.”78  The Supreme Court agreed that an 
adoption of the “unitary waters” approach would lead to the 
conclusion that the District may operate the S-9 pump station without 
an NPDES permit, but declined to review or resolve the argument.79
Although the Court acknowledged that the Eleventh Circuit 
endorsed a test which considered whether the transfer of water 
contents would naturally occur, it directly refused to determine 
whether this test was adequate.80  Justice Scalia, concurring in the 
judgment, thought that a remand was not necessary because the 
Eleventh Circuit had already considered and rejected the “unitary 
waters” argument.81  Justice Scalia would have rather left the 
Government’s “unitary waters” theory “to be considered in another 
case.”82  Despite Justice Scalia’s hesitation to further explore the 
“unitary waters” theory, courts all over the country will now find 
themselves face-to-face with the theory as they decide whether water 
diversion facilities connect two “meaningfully distinct” bodies of 
water or whether they involve “two hydrologically indistinguishable 
parts of a single water body.”83
 78 Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 106. 
Congress intended that such pollution instead would be addressed 
through local nonpoint source pollution programs.  Section 
1314(f)(2)(F), which concerns nonpoint sources, directs the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to give States information on 
the evaluation and control of “pollution resulting from . . . changes in 
the movement, flow, or circulation of any navigable waters or ground 
waters, including changes caused by the construction of dams, levees, 
channels, causeways, or flow diversion facilities. 
 Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f)(2)(F) (2000)) (ellipses in original). 
 79 Id. at 109. 
 80 Id. at 111. 
 81 Id. at 112 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  “That the 
argument was not phrased in the same terms or argued with the same clarity does 
not mean it was not made.”  Id. at 113. 
 82 Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 112. 
 83 Id. at 109.  “[T]he ‘unitary waters’ argument will now be presented in various 
water diversion cases working their way through the courts and citizens suits seeking 
injunctive relief against water diversion structures will continue to be filed.”  David 
Ashton, More Soup: Local Implications of the Supreme Court’s Ruling in South Florida 
Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, E-Outlook 
Environmental Hot Topics and Legal Updates, Oregon State Bar Environmental & 
Natural Resources Section, Issue 1 (2004), at 2, available at http://www.osbenviro. 
homestead.com/files/2004issue1.pdf. 
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III. WHAT IS “MEANINGFULLY DISTINCT?” 
A. The “Unitary Waters” Theory 
In Miccosukee, the Government argued that for purposes of 
determining whether there had been “any addition of any pollutant 
to navigable waters from any point source,” all the water bodies that 
fall within the CWA’s definition of “navigable waters” should be 
viewed “unitarily” for purposes of NPDES requirements.84  According 
to this “unitary waters” theory, since the CWA requires NPDES 
permits only where there is an addition of a pollutant “to navigable 
waters,” such permits are not required when “water from one 
navigable water body is discharged, unaltered, into another navigable 
water body.”85  An amicus brief filed by the Government argued that 
the pollutants are already in waters of the United States and therefore 
cannot be added by a point source that simply transports them to a 
different location in this network.86  As stated by the Government, 
Section 502(12) cannot reasonably be understood to include an 
activity that merely transports navigable waters from one location, 
through a “point source,” to another location.  Such an activity 
can conceivably lead to changes in water quality, but it does not, 
within the normal meaning of the relevant terms, constitute an 
“addition” of any pollutant to “the waters of the United States.”87
The Government used statutory interpretation and the CWA’s 
definitions to support its “unitary waters” argument.88  By leaving out 
the modifier “any” in conjunction with the phrase “navigable waters,” 
the Government suggested that Congress consciously chose for “the 
waters of the United States” to be viewed as a whole for NPDES 
requirements.89  Once a pollutant was present in a segment of “the 
waters of the United States,” a “discharge” would not result if it was 
merely conveyed to a different water segment.90  According to the 
Government, Congress used the modifier “any” with reference to 
“addition,” “pollutant,” and “point source,” and if Congress had 
actually intended the phrase “addition of a pollutant” to include the 
movement of one navigable water body into another navigable water 
body, it would have clearly defined the “discharge of a pollutant” to 
 84 Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 106. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 37, at 16. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 19. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
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incorporate any addition of any pollutant to “a specific portion” of 
the navigable waters from any point source.91
Existing case law also supports the Government’s “unitary 
waters” theory.  For instance, the District of Columbia and Sixth 
Circuits have held that hydroelectric dams and similar structures do 
not require NPDES permits.92  In National Wildlife Federation v. 
Gorsuch,93 the National Wildlife Federation (“NWF”) sought to 
control changes in water quality resulting from dam operations.94  
The NWF petitioned the EPA to establish effluent guidelines for 
water quality problems caused by dams to waters downstream such as 
oxygen depletion,95 temperature changes,96 sediment disruption 
impairing water quality,97 and gas supersaturation.98  When the EPA 
refused, the NWF filed suit seeking a judicial declaration that the 
dam-induced water quality changes should be subject to NPDES 
permitting requirements.99
The NWF argued that an “addition” occurs “when (1) a dam 
causes pollutants to enter the reservoir and (2) the polluted water 
subsequently passes through the dam—the point source—into the 
formerly unpolluted river below.”100  The EPA took the position that 
 91 Id.  “Congress would not have extended NPDES permitting requirements to 
potentially thousands of water diversion facilities without any textual 
acknowledgement of that intention.”  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 
supra note 37, at 19. 
 92 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 174–75 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Nat’l 
Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 589 (6th Cir. 1988). 
 93 Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 161. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Waters low in oxygen may kill fish and limit a river’s ability to break down 
pollutants and other organic matter.  See id.  If oxygen is completely depleted, 
compounds such as iron, manganese, and phosphate “tend to be leached from 
bottom muds into the reservoir” which can “harm fish, make the water unpalatable 
for drinking, and foster undesirable plant growth.”  Id. at 163. 
 96 Certain species of fish can only survive in warm water, while other species can 
only survive in cold water; thus, any changes in water temperature caused by dams 
can kill certain species of fish.  Id. 
 97 The plaintiffs argued that the dams will cause the reservoir to fill with 
sediment, which “in some cases can require periodic dredging or sluicing.”  Id. at 
164. 
 98 Water mixes with the air when it plunges from the reservoir into the 
downstream river, causing the downstream river to become “supersaturated,” that is, 
“aerated in excess of normal concentration.”  Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 164.  
Supersaturated water can be fatal to fish and the plaintiffs became concerned of this 
after more than 400,000 fish died of gas bubble disease because of supersaturated gas 
caused by spills over the unfinished Harry S. Truman Dam in Missouri.  See Nat’l 
Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 1291, 1302 (D.D.C. 1982). 
 99 Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 161. 
 100 Id. at 174. 
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dam releases into downstream receiving waters do not constitute the 
“addition” of pollutants, and that dams are non-point sources rather 
than point sources.101  Under the EPA’s view, for there to be an 
addition of a pollutant from a point source, “the point source must 
introduce the pollutant into navigable water from the outside world; 
dam-caused pollution, in contrast, merely passes through the dam 
from one body of navigable water (the reservoir) into another (the 
downstream river).”102  The D.C. Circuit extended great deference to 
the EPA’s interpretations, noting that “[t]he agency’s construction 
must be upheld if . . . it is ‘sufficiently reasonable,’ even if it is not 
‘the only reasonable one or even the reading the court would have 
reached.’”103  Although the court stated that the language of the 
statute permits either the NWF’s or the EPA’s construction, the D.C. 
Circuit reasoned that because Congress indicated that the EPA 
should have discretion in defining what constitutes point sources and 
pollutants, it also would have intended the EPA to have similar 
discretion in defining the term “addition.”104  Therefore, the D.C. 
Circuit upheld the EPA’s interpretation that a point source must 
“itself physically introduce[] a pollutant into the water from the 
outside world.”105
The NWF again brought a citizen suit in National Wildlife 
Federation v. Consumers Power Company106 against a company that owned 
 101 Id. at 165. 
 102 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 103 Id. at 171 (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign 
Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 39 (1981)). 
 104 Id. at 175.  It is significant to note that the D.C. Circuit decided Gorsuch just two 
years before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, a landmark case in the law of judicial deference.  467 U.S. 837 
(1984).  The Chevron Court held that where a “statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue [under review], the question for the court is whether the 
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”  Id. at 843.  In 
order to establish permissibility, courts should determine whether the statute’s 
silence or ambiguity represents an explicit or implicit delegation of authority to the 
agency to analyze the issue.  Id. at 843–44.  An explicit statutory gap suggests an 
express delegation of authority to the agency to analyze the specific provision of the 
statute, and courts should give the legislative regulations controlling weight “unless 
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”  Id.  An implicit 
statutory gap also delegates interpretive authority to the agency and “a court may not 
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation 
made by the administrator of an agency.”  Id. at 844.  Therefore, a court may reject 
an agency interpretation not only because it conflicts with the express intentions of 
the statute, but also because it is an unreasonable interpretation of an ambiguous 
statute.  Id. 
 105 Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 174–75. 
 106 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988). 
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and operated a hydroelectric facility along the eastern shore of Lake 
Michigan.107  The facility pumped water to a man-made reservoir 
during hours of low-cost electricity, allowing the water to drive 
turbine generators on its return to the Lake during peak hours.108  
When the pumps withdrew water, and again when the returning 
water drove the turbines, fish were drawn through the pumps, killing 
them and releasing remains into Lake Michigan.109  The NWF argued 
that the release of the fish parts was an addition of a pollutant to 
Lake Michigan which required an NPDES permit under the CWA.110
The EPA argued that an “addition” of a pollutant requires the 
physical introduction of the pollutant “from the outside world.”111  
Following Gorsuch’s deferential reasoning, the court accepted the 
EPA’s interpretation of “addition” as permissible, stating that the 
facility “merely change[d] the movement, flow, or circulation of 
navigable waters when it temporarily impound[ed] waters from Lake 
Michigan in a storage reservoir, but [did] not alter their character as 
waters of the United States.”112  According to the Sixth Circuit, 
“Congress apparently intended that pollution problems caused by 
dams and other flow diversion facilities are generally to be regulated 
by means other than the NPDES permit program.”113
The EPA’s interpretations in Gorsuch and Consumers Power both 
support the “unitary waters” theory by creating a distinction between 
water diversion facilities that merely convey unaltered water and 
facilities that have long been subject to permitting requirements 
 107 Id. at 581. 
 108 Id. at 581–82. 
 109 Id. at 582. 
 110 Id. at 584.  “Millions of pounds of live fish, dead fish and fish remains annually 
discharged into Lake Michigan by the Ludington facility are pollutants within the 
meaning of the CWA, since they are ‘biological materials.’”  Id. at 583; see also Ass’n 
of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 111 Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 584. 
 112 Id. at 589.  The court attempted to distinguish such dam facilities from 
steam/electric industrial operations which remove water, allowing the water to enter 
the industrial complex and absorb heat and other minerals produced by the plant or 
electric generator before being added to the waters of the United States.  Id. at 589. 
 113 Id. at 587. 
Section 304(f)(2)(F) provides that the EPA shall issue information on 
(1) guidelines for identifying and evaluating the nature and extent of 
nonpoint sources of pollutants, and (2) processes, procedures, and 
methods to control pollution resulting from . . . (F) changes in the 
movements, flow, or circulation of any navigable waters or ground 
waters, including changes caused by the construction of dams, levees, 
channels, causeways, or flow diversion facilities. 
Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f)(2)(F) (2000)) (ellipses in original). 
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because they actually alter the water by adding a pollutant before 
conveying it.114  For instance, both courts noted that if a pumping 
station leaks oil, grease, or other pollutants into waters (as opposed to 
merely conveying or connecting those waters), that addition is subject 
to an NPDES permit.115  Also, Section 402 of the CWA subjects placer 
mining116 of ore deposits in streams and rivers to the NPDES 
permitting program because the process results in the excavation and 
point source discharge of dirt and gravel into navigable waters.117  
Section 404 of the CWA, which specifically addresses dredged and fill 
material, subjects the deposit or redeposit of such material to a 
specialized permitting program because that activity results in the 
point source discharge of dredged or fill materials into navigable 
waters.118
Also, if water is diverted for an intervening use, the water may 
lose its status as “waters of the United States” and consequently 
become subject, upon reintroduction into navigable waters, to the 
NPDES permitting process.  One example of this is if an industrial 
user withdraws water from a navigable water body for process or 
cooling purposes and returns the water into the same water body 
through a point source.119  Another example is if a facility withdraws 
water from a navigable water body, removes preexisting pollutants to 
purify the water, and then discharges the removed pollutants 
(possibly in a concentrated form) back into the navigable water body 
while retaining the purified water for use in the facility.120
 114 See, e.g., Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 586. 
To the extent that no more has been shown than that unclean water 
flows out of the dam, Congress clearly displayed an intention to 
exempt dams from the Clean Water Act.  However, if the dam itself 
added pollutants to the water, rather than merely transmitting the 
water coming into it, in whatever altered form, then it would be subject 
to the NPDES permit system. 
Id. 
 115 Id.; Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 165. 
 116 Placer mining has been described as “one of four basic methods of mining 
metal ores; it involves the mining of alluvial or glacial deposits of loose gravel, sand, 
soil, clay, or mud called ‘placers.’ These placers often contain particles of gold and 
other heavy minerals.”  Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 117 See id. at 1285. 
 118 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000); United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 335–36 (4th 
Cir. 2000); United States v. M.C.C. of Fla., Inc., 772 F.2d 1501, 1503–06 (11th Cir. 
1985); Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 923–25 (5th Cir. 
1983). 
 119 40 C.F.R. §§ 122–125 (2005). 
 120 See In re City of Phoenix, Ariz. Squaw Peak & Deer Valley Water Treatment 
Plants, 9 E.A.D. 515, 2000 WL 1664964 (EPA Envtl. App. Bd. Nov. 1, 2000). 
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Gorsuch and Consumers Power give the impression that any 
pollutant created by or passing through a man-made facility is not an 
“addition” to the receiving waters so long as the upstream or 
downstream waters were in some way contiguous.  Nevertheless, it is 
important to recognize that the true holdings of both cases were that 
the EPA’s interpretations were reasonable and warranted 
deference.121  Once courts were given the power to interpret the 
CWA, in the absence of a reasonable interpretation by the EPA, the 
definition of the term “addition” began to change and these 
interpretations can now be used to challenge the “unitary waters” 
theory. 
B. The “Unitary Waters” Theory’s Shortcomings 
Although the Supreme Court refused to rule on the “unitary 
waters” theory, it did suggest that several NPDES provisions might 
contradict the theory.122  For instance, the CWA appears to protect 
not only the “waters of the United States” as a whole, but also 
individual water bodies by allowing states to set individualized 
ambient water quality standards.123  By setting such water quality 
standards, states take into consideration the designated uses of the 
navigable waters involved, as well as the water quality criteria for such 
waters based upon the uses designated.124  The water quality standards 
directly affect local NPDES permits because if the standard permit 
conditions fail to achieve the water quality goals for a given water 
body, the state must determine the total pollutant load that the water 
body can sustain and then allocate that load among the permit-
holders who discharge into the water body.125  For each non-
compliant body, states must develop water pollution budgets and 
 121 But see Brief of Amici Curiae the City of New York et al. in Support of 
Petitioner at 27, Miccosukee, 541 U.S. 95 (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22220093. 
Although in Gorsuch, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals 
stated that the EPA interpretation was entitled to “great deference,” the 
decision itself demonstrates that the court did not simply defer to [the] 
EPA.  Rather, it contains a detailed analysis of the specific language of 
the [CWA] and its legislative history, as well as an evaluation of policy, 
weighing the interests of preserving the integrity of the waters of the 
United States against the interests of states in water management.  
Instead of giving undue deference to the EPA interpretation, the 
Gorsuch court labored to ensure that it evaluated the competing 
interests of the [CWA] against local water management issues. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 122 Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 107. 
 123 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (2000). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. § 1313(d). 
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remedial pollutant loading allocations, known as “total maximum 
daily loads” (“TMDLs”), to address both point and non-point sources 
of pollutants in an effort to achieve compliance with applicable water 
quality standards.126
An amicus brief filed by the State of New York in Miccosukee 
cautioned against using the “unitary waters” theory, stating that to 
adopt such a “dubious theory would be manifestly inconsistent with 
the [CWA], and deprive States of effective tools to monitor, maintain, 
and achieve water quality consistent with the designated use and 
water quality criteria applicable to each individual water body within 
their borders.”127  It was further noted by the respondents that 
Congress had exempted only two categories in its definition of the 
terms “pollutant”:  
(A) ‘sewage from vessels or a discharge incidental to the normal 
operation of a vessel of the Armed Forces’ . . . ; [and] (B) water, 
gas, or other material which is injected into a well to facilitate 
[the] production of oil or gas, or water derived in association with 
oil or gas production and disposed of in a well, if the well . . . is 
approved by authority of the State in which the well is located.128
Given that Congress had expressly defined these two categories, “[i]t 
could have [also] extended the exceptions to include pollutants from 
one navigable water to another.  It did not.”129
After Gorsuch and Consumers Power, the issue of water transfer and 
the exemption of dam pollution from NPDES permitting 
requirements remained unchallenged until courts began to deny 
deference to the EPA’s policies and distinguish the facts in Gorsuch 
and Consumers Power.  In Dubois v. United States Department of 
Agriculture,130 the First Circuit held that an NPDES permit was 
necessary for an interbasin water transfer.131  In order to make snow, a 
ski resort operator moved water from the East Branch of the polluted 
Pemigewasset River into a relatively undefiled pond, called Loon 
 126 Id. § 1313(d)(1)(C)–(D).  See Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1139 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (holding that the CWA clearly requires TMDLs to be set for waters not 
meeting water quality standards due to both point and nonpoint sources, and that 
nothing in the statute indicates that TMDLs were not required for waters impaired 
only by nonpoint sources). 
 127 Brief of the States of New York et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 12, Miccosukee, 541 U.S. 95 (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22766718. 
 128 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2000). 
 129 Brief for the Respondent Friends of the Everglades at 26, Miccosukee, 541 U.S. 
95 (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22733911. 
 130 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 131 Id. at 1299. 
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Pond, that was at an elevation upstream from the East Branch.132  
Water from Loon Pond naturally flowed into the East Branch, but 
water from the East Branch did not naturally flow into Loon Pond.133  
Loon Pond ranked in the upper ninety-fifth percentile of all lakes 
and ponds in northern New England for low levels of phosphorous 
and therefore had limited plant growth, high water clarity, and high 
total biological production.134  The pond not only supported a variety 
of life in its ecosystem, but it also was a major source of drinking 
water for the town just below it.135  In contrast, “intake water taken 
from the East Branch contain[ed] bacteria, other aquatic organisms 
such as Giardia lambia, phosphorous, turbidity and heat.”136  Oil and 
grease were also allegedly present in the discharge water.137
A citizen suit, brought against the Forest Service, claimed that 
the Forest Service violated the CWA “by failing to obtain an NPDES 
permit before approving [the] plan to remove water from the East 
Branch, use it to pressurize and prevent freezing in its snowmaking 
equipment, and then discharge the used water into Loon Pond.”138  
The district court ruled there was no “addition” of pollutants to Loon 
Pond because the intake water from the East Branch and the water 
from Loon Pond were all part of a “singular entity,” the “waters of the 
United States,” and must not therefore be considered individually.139  
As long as the pipes added no new pollutants, the district court 
concluded that the transfer of water from the East Branch into Loon 
Pond did not necessitate an NPDES permit.140
The First Circuit reversed, holding that that the East Branch of 
the Pemigewasset River and Loon Pond were two wholly distinct 
bodies of water and that the transfer of polluted water from the 
Pemigewasset River into Loon Pond was an “addition” under the 
CWA, which required an NPDES permit.141  The First Circuit held 
that the “singular entity” argument had no basis in law and that 
under such an interpretation of “addition,” the pollution of one 
navigable water would necessitate all other navigable waters to 
passively suffer the same fate: 
 132 Id. at 1277–78. 
 133 Id. at 1297. 
 134 Id. at 1277. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Dubois, 102 F.3d at 1278. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 1296. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 1299. 
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We can take judicial notice that the Pemigewasset River was for 
years one of the most polluted rivers in New England, the 
repository for raw sewage from factories and towns.  It emitted an 
overwhelming odor and was known to peel the paint off buildings 
located on its banks.  Yet, under the district court’s theory, even if 
such conditions still prevailed, a proposal to withdraw water from 
the Pemigewasset to discharge it into Loon Pond would be 
analogous to moving water from the top to the bottom of a single 
pond; it would not constitute an “addition” of pollutants “from an 
external source” because both the East Branch and Loon Pond 
are part of the “singular” waters of the United States.  The district 
court apparently would reach the same conclusion regardless of 
how polluted the Pemigewasset was or how pristine Loon Pond 
was.  We do not believe Congress intended such an irrational 
result.142
Additionally, the court found that the transferred water ceased to be 
a water of the United States when it became subject to private control 
rather than natural processes.143  The Dubois court stated it was 
“simply wrong” to analogize the situation to a “dam that merely 
accumulates the same water” as in Gorsuch, or a “pump storage facility 
that stores water from one source in a different place” as in Consumers 
Power.144  Distinguishing the dam cases as involving “one flowing water 
body into another stationary, colder body,” the court concluded it 
simply could not allow “such a watering down of Congress’ clear 
statutory protections.”145
Five years later the issue surfaced again when the Second Circuit 
decided Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New 
York.146 The court held that New York City needed an NPDES permit 
for diverting water from one drainage basin into another in order to 
facilitate its supply of drinking water to the city’s population.147  The 
 142 Dubois, 102 F.3d at 1297. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 1299 (italics in original). The First Circuit conceded that internal 
pumping would not cause an “addition” of pollutants to the pond because that would 
be considered a redistribution of pollutants from one part of the pond to the other.  
Id. at 1296–97.  Internal pumping involves “no barrier separating the water at the top 
of a pond from the water at the bottom of the same pond; chemicals, organisms, and 
even heat are able to pass from the top to the bottom or vice versa, at rates 
determined only by laws of science.”  Id. at 1297.  The court concluded that the 
transfer of water from the East Branch to Loon Pond, however, would not occur 
naturally, stating that “the East Branch and Loon Pond are not the same body of 
water; the East Branch is indeed a source ‘external’ to Loon Pond.”  Id. 
 145 Dubois, 102 F.3d at 1299. 
 146 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 147 Id. at 493. 
WELSH FINAL.DOC 10/12/2005  6:51:05 PM 
310 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:289 
 
transfer involved moving water from the Schoharie Reservoir through 
the Shandaken Tunnel and into the Esopus Creek, a Hudson River 
tributary.148  The City of New York had operated this transfer system 
since before World War II.149  Absent the tunnel and under natural 
conditions, water from the Schoharie Reservoir would never reach 
the Esopus Creek; instead, the water leaving the Reservoir would 
“flow north in Schoharie Creek, join the Mohawk River, and flow into 
the Hudson River.”150
A group of environmental organizations alleged that the 
Shandaken Tunnel discharged “pollutants in the form of ‘suspended 
solids,’ ‘turbidity,’ and heat into the Esopus Creek,” thereby violating 
the state water quality standards and requiring an NPDES permit.151  
While the EPA maintained that dam-produced pollution is exempt 
from permit requirements, the Second Circuit refused to grant broad 
deference to the EPA’s position, explaining that “‘interpretations 
contained in formats such as opinion letters are “entitled to respect”  
. . . but only to the extent that those interpretations have the “power 
to persuade.”’”152  The court did not find the EPA’s position 
persuasive at all and was able to distinguish the facts from those in 
Gorsuch and Consumers Power.  While Gorsuch and Consumers Power 
involved the “recirculation of water, without anything added ‘from 
the outside world,’” the Second Circuit was faced with a situation 
where water was artificially diverted from its natural course in order 
to travel many miles through a tunnel and into the Esopus Creek.153  
Because these two water bodies were “utterly unrelated,” the court 
held that “[n]o one [could] reasonably argue that the water in the 
Reservoir and the Esopus [were] in any sense the ‘same,’ such that 
‘addition’ of one to the other [was] a logical impossibility.”154
 148 Id. at 484. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at 485.  “Esopus Creek, Catskill contended, is naturally clearer and cooler 
than the water entering it from the Tunnel and supports ‘one of the premier trout 
fishing streams in the Catskill Region.’”  Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 485. 
 152 Id. at 491 (quoting Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)) 
(ellipses in original). 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. at 492. The Catskill Mountains court also rejected the “singular entity” 
theory raised in Dubois: 
Such a theory would mean that movement of water from one discrete 
water body to another would not be an addition even if it involved a 
transfer of water from a water body contaminated with myriad 
pollutants to a pristine water body containing few or no pollutants.  
Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the 
word “addition.” 
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The Ninth Circuit encountered similar issues and held in 
Northern Plains Resource Council v. Fidelity Exploration and Development 
Co.155 that Montana could not exempt Fidelity Exploration & 
Development Company (“Fidelity”) from its obligation to obtain an 
NPDES permit for its coal bed methane (“CBM”) extraction 
process.156  During the extraction process, groundwater was pumped 
to the surface and into various holding ponds, including the Tongue 
River which was used for irrigation by farmers downstream.157  
Though the extraction process did not actually add pollutants to the 
groundwater, the water naturally contained calcium, magnesium, 
sodium, chloride, fluoride, and many other substances that could 
affect the downstream farms, “caus[ing] soil particles to unbind and 
disperse, destroying soil structure and reducing or eliminating the 
ability of the soil to drain water.”158  Since the CBM waters came from 
deep underground aquifers, it would never reach the Tongue River, 
but for Fidelity’s extraction process.159  The Ninth Circuit rejected the 
argument that such discharge water could not be a pollutant simply 
because it was “unaltered and transported from one body of water to 
another.”160  Instead, the court concluded that its situation was 
“practically indistinguishable” from Catskill Mountains and Dubois, 
even if the pollutants were not added by man, but were naturally 
present.161
A comparable holding was made by the Ninth Circuit in Borden 
Ranch Partnership v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,162 although 
the permit required was a Section 404 permit from the Army Corps of 
Engineers for “dredged or fill material” instead of a Section 402 
NPDES permit.163  At issue was a form of agricultural activity called 
“deep ripping” in which long metal prongs were dragged through soil 
behind a tractor or a bulldozer and a “ripper” gouged through a 
restrictive layer of soil, disgorging the soil and then dragging it 
Id. at 493. 
 155 325 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 156 Id. at 1165. 
 157 Id. at 1158. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. at 1163. 
 161 Fidelity, 325 F.3d at 1163. 
 162 261 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 163 Id. at 818.  While a Section 402 permit concerns the discharge of a “pollutant” 
from a “point source” into the Nation’s waters, a Section 404 permit grants the Army 
Corps of Engineers the authority to issue permits for discharges of dredged or fill 
material.   
See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(A) (2000). 
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behind the ripper.164  The defendant argued that deep ripping was 
not an “addition” of a “pollutant” into wetlands “because it simply 
churns up soil that is already there, placing it back basically where it 
came from.”165  Nevertheless, the court held that a “pollutant” had 
certainly been “added” even if it did not involve the introduction of 
material brought in from somewhere else.166  The court reasoned, 
“[p]rior to deep ripping, the protective layer of soil was intact, 
holding the wetland in place.  Afterwards, that soil was wrenched up, 
moved around, and redeposited somewhere else.”167  Therefore, a 
Section 404 permit was required in order for the defendant to 
continue his practice of deep ripping.168
An inference can be made from the previous cases that, under 
certain circumstances, the mere transport of unaltered water from 
the diverting water body to the receiving water body may require an 
NPDES permit.169  Such a circumstance would occur if the unaltered 
water is diverted into a receiving water body where it would not 
naturally flow and the diverted water degrades the receiving water 
body.  Therefore, a “unitary waters” theory would not survive should 
courts choose to myopically focus on the natural flow of waters rather 
than the fact that they are all somehow connected to one another in 
order to determine whether they are “meaningfully distinct.”170
 164 Borden Ranch, 261 F.3d at 812. 
 165 Id. at 814. 
 166 Id. at 815. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. at 818.  The Ninth Circuit based its holding on cases it thought 
“recognize[d] that activities that destroy the ecology of a wetland are not immune 
from the [CWA] merely because they do not involve the introduction of material 
brought in from somewhere else.”  Id. at 814–15.  For instance, the Ninth Circuit 
“considered a claim that placer mining activities were exempt” from the CWA, and 
held that “removing material from a stream bed, sifting out the gold, and returning 
the material to the stream bed was an ‘addition’ of a pollutant.”  Borden Ranch, 261 
F.3d at 814 (citing Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 1990)).  Also, the 
Borden Ranch court aligned its reasoning with that of the Fourth Circuit in United 
States v. Deaton, where the court held: 
It is of no consequence that what is now dredged spoil was previously 
present on the same property in the less threatening form of dirt and 
vegetation in an undisturbed state.  What is important is that once that 
material was excavated from the wetland, its redeposit in that same 
wetland added a pollutant where none had been before. 
Id. (quoting United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 335–336 (4th Cir. 2000)). 
 169 See Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. City of New York, 273 
F.3d 481, 492 (2d Cir. 2001); N. Plains Res. Council v. Fidelity Exploration and Dev. 
Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 170 See Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 96.  Still open for debate, however, is whether an 
NPDES permit is required despite section 511(a)(2) of the CWA “which states that 
the CWA ‘shall not be construed’ as ‘affecting or impairing the authority of the 
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IV. THE INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCES OF REGULATING THE 
MOVEMENT OF UNALTERED WATER UNDER THE CWA 
If courts decline to accept the “unitary waters” theory, an NPDES 
permit may be required for every engineered diversion of one 
navigable water into another, and thousands of new permits might 
have to be issued, particularly in the western states where engineered 
transfers are relied upon by water supply networks.171  As the South 
Florida Water Management District argued: 
A host of state and local water management agencies and their 
national organizations, numerous States, and state and municipal 
government organizations . . . have explained that imposition on 
NPDES permitting on hundreds of thousands of such [water] 
transfers would be impractical, wasteful, hugely disruptive of the 
Nation’s intricate system of water allocation and control, and 
entirely otiose in light of nonpoint source programs and powers 
that address pollution in diverted waters.172
Among those affected by the new permitting requirements will be 
agricultural irrigation districts, suppliers of drinking water, mineral 
extraction operations, electric power producers, and residential 
developers.173  Water management agencies will be exposed to huge 
Secretary of the Army (A) to maintain navigation or (B) under the Act of March 3, 
1899’” which, according to section 511, is the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.  Paul 
F. Foley, Missing the Point with Point-Source “Addition” Semantics: Section 511 of the Clean 
Water Act Exempts Interconnected Waterways from Section 402 Jurisdiction, Period?, 9 OCEAN 
& COASTAL L.J. 65, 78–79 (2003).  Though not mentioned in Miccosukee, this 
argument notes that the CWA cannot “affect or impair” the Secretary of the Army’s 
navigation authority or authority under the Rivers and Harbors Act: 
Pursuant to the Secretary of the Army’s authority, the Army Corps 
issues permits for activities affecting navigable waters.  Section 10 of 
the Rivers and Harbors Act prohibits altering or modifying, “in any 
manner,” the “course, location, condition, or capacity of” any navigable 
water, including canals or “the channel of any navigable water,” 
without the Secretary of the Army’s authorization.  This language is 
extremely broad: requiring a Section 402 permit for a canal pump 
station . . . and the prospect of the canal’s continued operation being 
cast in doubt—is, on its face, a change in the “condition, or capacity 
of” that canal in some “manner.”  Any such change in the condition or 
capacity of a waterbody must be approved by the Army Corps under 
Section 10—not by EPA under Section 402 of the CWA. 
Id. at 78–79 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000)). 
 171 Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico in Support of 
Petitioner at 2–4, Miccosukee, 541 U.S. 95 (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22137032. 
 172 Reply Brief at 13, Miccosukee, 541 U.S. 95 (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 23051957. 
 173 See Davis & Doster, supra note 15, at 91–92.  Suppliers of drinking water move 
water from basins in which water is plentiful to basins in which need exceeds supply; 
mineral extraction operations often redirect waters over large land area; electric 
power producers fear they will need permits to discharge cooling water in separate 
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penalties for violations, and even criminal prosecution.174  Also, the 
EPA will suffer many administrative burdens as it seeks to develop 
technology-based effluent limitations for the new class of dischargers 
and confronts an already backlogged NPDES program.175
One of the most troublesome effects of new NPDES permitting 
requirements will be the disruption to the agricultural economy if the 
newly-permitted irrigation districts seek to pass the high costs of 
treatment back upstream to their agricultural clients.176  These 
increased costs could thwart the competitiveness of United States 
agricultural commodities in global markets and force alterations in 
numerous aspects of farming operations such as crop selection, 
tillage practices, and pesticide use.177  If farmers are given an 
incentive to move away from certain practices and products, pesticide 
manufacturers will also suffer by encountering changes in demand 
for particular crop protection products that would otherwise have to 
be removed from downstream waters.178  The increased agricultural 
costs could also mean relocating agricultural production to areas that 
have relatively lower costs.179  Though this may strike a balance for the 
benefit of consumers, it may also continue to harm the environment 
if these lower costs are achieved by ignoring harmful environmental 
externalities.  This availability to simply relocate production, however, 
may be somewhat unrealistic: 
waters from which the water was withdrawn; and residential developers may be 
limited by the amount of water available to expand communities, particularly those 
in warm and dry climates.  Id. at 97. 
 174 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.  Even a negligent violation can bring 
significant fines and two years in prison.  33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (2000).  In Catskill 
Mountains, the district court issued a hefty $5.7 million penalty against the City of 
New York.  See Catskill Mountains, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 57. 
 175 See Reply Brief, supra note 172, at 15 (citing EPA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, 
EPA SHOULD TAKE FURTHER STEPS TO ADDRESS FUNDING SHORTFALLS AND TIME 
SLIPPAGES IN PERMIT COMPLIANCE SYSTEM MODERNIZATION EFFORT, No. 2003-M-00014 
(May 20, 2003)).  It has been suggested that the NPDES program is an overly 
burdensome requirement simply because it lacks the flexibility to deal appropriately 
with transfers of untreated water.  Brief of Amici Curiae the City of New York et al., 
supra note 121, at 13–14.  “Where the transferred water contains pollutants that are 
not introduced by the entity operating the transfer, as in Miccosukee (where the water 
contains phosphorous from urban runoff) and Catskill Mountains (where the water 
contains naturally occurring turbidity), this requirement can place an impossible 
burden on the transferor.”  Id. 
 176 See Brief for Amici Curiae Florida Fruit and Vegetable Ass’n et al. in Support of 
Petitioner at 4, Miccosukee, 541 U.S. 95 (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22118364. 
 177 See Davis & Doster, supra note 15, at 97. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
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Manufacturers and traders may relocate when times are tough, 
but the farmer’s reliance on land (an asset that cannot be moved 
from place to place) creates a somewhat permanent interest in 
the stability and security of the state. A given plot of land is 
irrevocably tied to the territorial state in which it happens to be 
located. This gives farmers an interest in the politics and defense 
of the state, as it limits their ability to relocate their assets when 
political winds change.180
The unexpected burden of permitting requirements may also 
increase costs and time delays that could force operations to cease.181  
After the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Miccosukee, several agricultural 
groups feared the costs and expenses associated with the ruling: 
If the Eleventh Circuit’s decision stands, the South Florida Water 
Management District (“SFWMD”) will have to increase its budget 
to pay for the expensive NPDES permitting process for S-9, the 
pump station that moves water from one side of a levee to the 
other in the same watershed.  SFWMD will more than likely 
obtain the funding to obtain and implement this NPDES permit 
by increasing agriculture privilege taxes, ad valorem taxes on 
property owners in the district, fees, and assessments.  The costs 
may be further magnified by the SFWMD having to take steps to 
permit many other structures or facilities similarly situated to the 
S-9 facility.182
Despite these agricultural groups’ outcries, it may be time for 
the community to accept responsibility and share the costs of their 
harms, as agricultural nutrient, pesticide, and sediment pollution 
remain as the leading source of impairment to the nation’s lakes, 
rivers, and estuaries.183  While added regulatory burdens will 
 180 Paul B. Thompson, Globalization, Losers and Property Rights, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL 
TRADE 602, 608 (2000). 
 181 Davis & Doster, supra note 15, at 96. 
In perhaps the majority of cases, local water management agencies will 
be unable to obtain or comply with NPDES permits for facilities that 
are essential to many public uses, including flood control, ensuring a 
reliable supply of water for domestic, commercial, and industrial uses, 
and fire suppression.  Where it is possible to comply with permit terms 
and conditions, the cost of doing so is incalculable.  The harm to the 
public will be enormous and direct if the Eleventh Circuit decision is 
upheld, while in most cases the decision will not lead to any 
measurable environmental benefit. 
Brief of Amici Curiae the City of New York et al., supra note 121, at 5. 
 182 Brief for Florida Fruit and Vegetable Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae, supra note 
176,  
at 4 (citations omitted). 
 183 J.B. Ruhl, Three Questions for Agriculture About the Environment, 17 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 395, 400 (2002). 
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effectively force farms out of business, this was true of many other 
industries that were forced to operate under the “polluter pays” ethic 
of environmental regulation.184  The challenge is “whether we have 
the political will to cause the farming industry some pain, but the 
ingenuity to do so with some sense of efficiency.”185
Courts still recognize the catastrophic consequences of forcing 
certain facilities to cease operations, and have often issued flexible 
rulings so as to accommodate the water management districts.186  For 
instance, in Miccosukee the Eleventh Circuit chose not to issue an 
injunction to stop operation of the S-9 pump station because it would 
have resulted in massive flooding in the urban, agricultural, and 
residential area.187  Similarly, the district court in Catskill Mountains 
declined to enjoin the City of New York from operating the 
Shandaken Tunnel without a permit because it would have led to 
 184 Id. at 406.  While other industries had to take costly measures to comply with 
environmental regulations and have adopted successful arrangements of 
environmental efficiency and production efficiency, the agricultural industry “has 
been stunted by widespread industry advocacy and government endorsement of the 
‘first stewards of the land’ rhetoric” which claims that because farmers “depend” on 
their land, they are “environmentally benign or, even better, a positive 
environmental force.” Id. at 401–03. Yet, the fishing industry is just as dependent on 
fisheries, but has nonetheless depleted the fisheries to unsustainable levels.  Id.  With 
regards to the “stewardship” argument of agricultural policy: 
[H]ow are we to count depositing fertilizers, pesticides, and animal 
wastes on the land, exposing soils to wind and water erosion, sucking 
water out of rivers and aquifers, and all the other traits of modern 
farming?  And regardless of how well they care for their land, the 
bottom line is that farming has significant adverse offsite impacts, as 
runoff and wind carry pollution, wastes, and sediments to distant lands 
and waters.  This is stewardship of the land? 
Id. at 401–02. 
 185 Id. at 406. 
Regulation at an appropriate level will be difficult to achieve in light of 
the political power of the agricultural lobby, the daunting technical 
and administrative difficulties of regulating such a decentralized 
industry, and the costs of implementing such regulations.  Yet, progress 
may be possible through free-market pricing, environmental subsidies, 
and taxes on agricultural inputs designed to reflect their 
environmental cost.  The issue is not different from many problems in 
environmental economics in that either appropriate pricing or 
equivalent regulation can lead to significantly improved, if not optimal, 
behavior. 
David E. Adelman & John H. Barton, Environmental Regulation for Agriculture: Towards 
a Framework to Promote Sustainable Intensive Agriculture, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 22 
(2002). 
 186 See Miccosukee, 280 F.3d at 1369–71; Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout 
Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 244 F. Supp. 2d 41, 54–55 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 187 See Miccosukee, 280 F.3d at 1369–71. 
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water supply shortages for millions of people.188  This raises a 
question regarding the realistic ability to enforce the NPDES 
program where high permit costs could disturb the livelihood of so 
many people. 
The imposition of permitting requirements on the diversion and 
delivery of water in an unaltered condition from one basin to another 
basin will most considerably impact the economic and social well-
being of the western states.189  According to a brief filed by the states 
of Colorado and New Mexico, “[w]est of the 100th Meridian, the 
nation is generally arid; that is, it receives less than the thirty  
inches of annual precipitation necessary to sustain non-irrigated 
agriculture. . . . Hence, it is necessary to divert and deliver water 
through a complex system of manmade and natural conveyances and 
reservoirs.”190  In the absence of such a system, agricultural regions 
would not be able to support crops and many popular cities would 
never have flourished, including Denver, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, and 
Phoenix.191
In Miccosukee, the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to allay the fear 
of high regulatory costs by suggesting that states or the EPA issue 
general permits to point sources associated with water distribution 
programs.192  Also, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Protection claimed that assertions stating that the NPDES permitting 
program was a “costly, time-consuming, burdensome and 
bureaucratic program that [would] ‘wreak havoc’” were simply 
 188 See Catskill Mountains, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 54–55. 
 189 Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico, supra note 171, 
at 5; see also Brief Amici Curiae of the Nat’l Water Res. Ass’n et al. in Support of 
Petitioner at 10, Miccosukee, 541 U.S. 95 (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22137029. 
 190 Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico, supra note 171, 
at 2.  “If water is the ‘lifeblood’ of the West, then transbasin diversions/deliveries are 
surely the ‘arteries’ that sustain the region’s cities, towns, agriculture and industry.”  
Id. at 29. 
 191 Id. at 2. 
 192 See Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 108.  But see Peter D. Nichols, Miccosukee: The 
Potential for Clean Water Act Discharge Permits for Water Transfers, 33 COLO. LAW. 119, 121 
(2004). 
If it ultimately is determined that engineered transfers are required to 
obtain NPDES permits, they will be subject to all attendant CWA 
requirements, including water quality standards, anti-degradation, and 
wasteload allocations for impaired waters.  These far-reaching 
requirements would accrue under any kind of permit, whether 
individual, general, or nationwide.  Many water rights owners would 
have no alternative to curtailing their water transfers to meet NPDES 
permitting conditions, wasteload allocations for impaired waters, and 
anti-degradation requirements of the CWA. 
Id. 
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“unsupported,” “not accurate,” and “highly speculative.”193  The 
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court interpreted the CWA to cover 
interbasin water transfers in 1986 and since then has not 
encountered any catastrophic consequences.194  Therefore, the 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection professed that 
“Pennsylvania’s actual experience with its NPDES program . . . 
establishes that the NPDES program provides a flexible, efficient and 
effective means to protect water quality and stream uses.”195
V. “WATERING DOWN” THE CWA’S AGRICULTURAL 
EXEMPTION AND SOVEREIGN POWERS OF THE STATES 
A. The Agricultural Exemption 
Even if it is agreed that the agricultural industry should share in 
the costs of its environmental harms, the fact of the matter is that the 
CWA expressly provides agricultural exemptions for the discharge of 
waters used for the production of crops.196  The NPDES program 
expressly prohibits any permit requirements for agricultural 
discharges, stating that “[t]he Administrator shall not require a 
permit under this section for discharges composed entirely of return 
flows from irrigated agriculture, nor shall the Administrator directly 
or indirectly require any State to require such a permit.”197  The 
possibility of federally regulating the movement of unaltered water 
under the NPDES program could effectively undermine these 
agricultural exemptions through “increased taxes, fees and/or 
assessments imposed by [water management districts] to pay for 
NPDES permits and technologies for . . . [certain] facilities.”198 
Originally, the NPDES program did not cover non-point sources, 
which were primarily agricultural; instead, these sources were 
 193 Brief of Amici Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. in 
Support of Respondents at 16, Miccosukee, 541 U.S. 95 (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 
22793537. 
 194 Id. at 11–18 (citing Del-AWARE Unlimited v. Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 508 A.2d 348 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986)). 
 195 Id. at 16.  The CWA provides for “schedules of compliance” to allow long-term 
implementation of corrective measures necessary to achieve compliance with 
applicable water quality standards, while allowing important, though problematic 
water diversions to continue in the short-term.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(17) (2000). 
 196 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(1), 1362(14) (2000). 
 197 Id. § 1341(a)(1). 
 198 Brief for Amici Curiae Florida Fruit and Vegetable Ass’n et al., supra note 176, 
at 5. 
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addressed by the states.199  As Senator Bob Dole reasoned, this would 
“place responsibility on the states for instituting and expanding the 
control of water pollution related to agriculture.”200  In the CWA’s 
1977 amendments, the exemption for “return flows from irrigated 
agriculture” was expressly added as an exclusion from the definition 
of “point source.”201  A provision prohibiting NPDES permits for 
agricultural discharges was also added.202  The Water Quality Act of 
1987 exempted “agricultural stormwater discharges” from the 
definition of “point source,” confirming Congress’ intent that 
agriculture is not covered as industrial or municipal pollution.203
If the diversion of unaltered water requires an NPDES permit 
because agricultural discharges have contributed to the “addition” of 
“pollutants” to the navigable waters, the regulatory costs of complying 
with the permit may be passed on to farmers and ranchers.204  
Consequently, the deliberate economic benefits realized from the 
agricultural exemptions may be substantially eroded, frustrating 
Congress’ primary intentions for the exemptions.  The Eleventh 
Circuit acknowledged this in Fishermen Against the Destruction of the 
Environment, Inc. v. Closter Farms, Inc.,205 where the court interpreted 
and applied the agricultural exemptions from the NPDES program.206  
Closter Farms irrigated sugar cane by a process called flood 
irrigation.207  Water from Lake Okeechobee was forced from 
irrigation canals “into the sugarcane fields by raising the water levels 
in the canals” and was then discharged back into the lake.208  
Stormwater was also pumped into the lake, rather than allowing it to 
follow its natural flow.209  The Eleventh Circuit held the discharges to 
 199 Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 208; 86 Stat. 816, 839–41 (1972) (codified as amended at 
33 U.S.C. § 1288 (2000)); S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 1 (1971), reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3669. 
 200 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3759 (supplemental views of Sen. Dole). 
 201 Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 33(b); 91 Stat. 1577 (1977) (codified as amended at 33 
U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000)).  This exclusion overrode a 1975 federal district court 
opinion holding the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
did not exclude point sources from agriculture from NPDES permitting.  Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 396 F. Supp. 1393, 1402 (D.D.C. 1975). 
 202 Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 33(c); 91 Stat. 1577 (1977) (codified as amended at 33 
U.S.C. § 1342(1) (2000)). 
 203 Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 503; 101 Stat. 7, 75 (1987) (codified as amended at 33 
U.S.C. § 1462(14) (2000)). 
 204 See Davis & Doster, supra note 15, at 97. 
 205 300 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 206 Id. at 1297. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. 
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the lake were covered by the agricultural exemptions and, with 
regards to the stormwater runoff, that “[n]othing in the language of 
the statute indicates that stormwater can only be discharged where it 
naturally would flow.”210  The court further held that the canals used 
to irrigate the sugarcane fields through flood irrigation were a 
“return flow from irrigation agriculture” and expressly exempt from 
the definition of “point sources” regulated by the NPDES program.211
Most of the cases involving the movement of unaltered water to 
another navigable water body, such as in Miccosukee, also involve 
pollution caused by agricultural runoff.212  If water diversion facilities 
are now forced to obtain NPDES permits because of this type of 
pollution, it is likely that costs associated with such regulation will be 
passed on or at least shared with agricultural communities; an effect 
which possibly undermines the very purpose of having an agricultural 
exemption under the CWA.213
B. Federalism 
“Federalism” concerns the balance of power between “a 
centralized but limited federal government and dispersed but 
relatively unfettered state governments.”214  It advances the protection 
of individual liberty by “preventing governmental power from 
concentrating in one governmental body or in a single person.”215  In 
enacting the CWA, Congress showed concern in maintaining states’ 
traditional rights and responsibilities “to plan the development and 
use of land and water resources” so as not to impair allocations by 
states of their waters.216  Therefore, extending the NPDES program to 
 210 Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000)). 
 211 Closter Farms, 300 F.3d at 1297. 
 212 Ruhl, supra note 183, at 400.  As of 1992, farm runoff released 1.16 million tons 
of phosphorous and 4.65 million tons of nitrogen into the nation’s waters each year.  
Id. 
 213 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2000). 
 214 Craig, supra note 32, at 119–20. 
 215 Id. at 120. 
 216 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000).  The CWA also states: 
Except as expressly provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter 
shall (1) preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision 
thereof or interstate agency to adopt or enforce (A) any standard or 
limitation respecting discharges of pollutants, or (B) any requirement 
respecting control or abatement of pollution; except that if an effluent 
limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, 
pretreatment standard, or standard of performance is in effect under 
this chapter, such State or political subdivision or interstate agency may 
not adopt or enforce any effluent limitation, or other limitation, 
effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of 
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the traditionally local water management activity of moving water 
across levees may fundamentally shift the federal-state balance 
achieved in the CWA.217
The CWA states that “[i]t is the policy of Congress that the 
authority of each State to allocate quantities of water within its 
jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired 
by the [CWA].”218  As a result, Congress chose to “recognize, preserve, 
and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to 
prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan the 
development and use (including restoration, preservation, and 
enhancement) of land and water resources.”219  Consequently, the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that the CWA must be interpreted 
with Congress’ intent to maintain the federal-state balance of powers 
in mind.220  In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States 
Army Corps of Engineers (“SWANCC”),221 the United States Supreme 
Court noted that land and water use decisions are traditionally and 
primarily state prerogatives and where a statutory interpretation 
“alters the federal-state framework by permitting federal 
encroachment upon a traditional state power,” Congress must clearly 
convey its intent.222
Congress has never expressly established its intent to impose 
NPDES permit requirements on transbasin diversions, though it has 
clearly expressed its intent to honor long-standing federal deference 
to state water law.223  In 1977, the Senate adopted the Wallop-Hart 
Amendment in reaction to proposals that “reducing water 
diversions/deliveries under state law might be necessary to solve 
water quality problems” and in order to ensure the protection of the 
performance which is less stringent than the effluent limitation, or 
other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment 
standard, or standard of performance under this chapter; or (2) be 
construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or 
jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (including 
boundary waters) of such States. 
Id. § 1370. 
 217 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 74, at 4. 
 218 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2000). 
 219 Id. § 1251(b). 
 220 See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 
159, 163 (2001) [hereinafter, “SWANCC”].  See also PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep’t of 
Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 704 (1994). 
 221 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
 222 Id. at 173. 
 223 See Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico, supra note 
171, at 5–9. 
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states’ sovereign powers.224  As part of the 1977 CWA amendments 
and building upon the 1972 amendments, Congress declared that the 
authority of each state to allocate quantities of water will not be 
impaired by the CWA and that nothing in the CWA will be construed 
to abrogate water rights established by any state.225  Therefore, it may 
be that NPDES permit requirements for the movement of unaltered 
water “under individual water rights allocated under state law would 
directly abrogate state water allocations” and that “[s]uch federal 
interference has important implications, not only for individual water 
rights, but also for comity among the states under interstate compacts 
and equitable apportionments and for the maximum utilization of 
scarce water resources.”226
VI. MAKING WAY THROUGH MURKY WATERS 
Based on the Supreme Court’s guidance in Miccosukee and 
supportive case law, it seems that the mere transport of unaltered 
water from one body of water to a water body that would not naturally 
receive this diverted water could require an NPDES permit if the 
diverted water degrades the receiving water body.227  Permitting the 
diversion of such unaltered water could affect thousands of dams, 
levees, aqueducts, canals, and other structures used for ordinary 
water management, public water supply, flood control, and 
navigation.228  While it could be argued that the NPDES program is 
the wrong tool for regulating water transfers and diversions, there 
remains a concern that allowing the unpermitted diversion of 
polluted water would open the door to major degradation of less 
polluted water bodies by more polluted ones, thereby creating a 
significant gap in the states’ authority under the CWA to protect and 
maintain the quality of their waters.229
 224 Id. at 10. 
 225 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2000). 
 226 Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico, supra note 171, 
at 12.  Western states are particularly concerned with how the CWA’s federal-state 
relationships affect the allocation of water:  “[t]he history of the relationship 
between the Federal Government and the States in the reclamation of the arid lands 
of the Western States is both long and involved, but through it runs the consistent 
thread of purposeful and continued deference to state water law by Congress.”  
California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978). 
 227 Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 112; Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. 
City of New York, 273 F.3d 481, 492 (2d Cir. 2001); N. Plains Res. Council v. Fidelity 
Exploration and Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 228 See Davis & Doster, supra note 15, at 92. 
 229 See Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico, supra note 
171, at 12. 
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The ultimate holding in Miccosukee on remand has the potential 
to overturn dam cases such as Gorsuch and Consumers Power.230  Both 
the C-11 basin and WCA-3 were part of the historical Everglades and 
have been described as waters that would essentially be a single water 
body, but for man’s intervention.231  To say that two bodies of water 
would be one, but for man’s intervention, would describe a dam and, 
under the established law, dams do not “add” pollutants to 
downstream waters.  Therefore, if the South Florida Water 
Management District is required to obtain an NPDES permit, despite 
the possibility that the C-11 basin and WCA-3 would together 
naturally be a single wetland, this would presumably contradict the 
holdings of the dam cases.  If the C-11 basin and WCA-3 are in fact 
found not to naturally constitute a single water body, the only 
alternative argument is the “unitary waters” theory.  Unfortunately, 
given the plain language, structure, history, and interpretations of the 
CWA, it is likely that the “unitary waters” argument will, in fact, not 
hold water. 
As more and more water diversion facilities are becoming 
exposed to stricter water regulations, each of their cases will come 
down to detailed and complex issues such as where the water would 
flow, but for the intervening facility, and the particular processes 
used to divert the water.  These potentially confusing and fact-
intensive inquiries have led facility operators and water districts to 
argue possible inconsistencies with the CWA’s agricultural 
exemption, the undermining of federalism, and administrative 
burdens.232 What these groups may ideally be seeking, however, is a 
separate exemption for their facilities under the CWA.  As Justice 
Scalia suggested: “The horribles that can be imagined–if they are 
really so horrible and ever come to pass–can readily be corrected by 
Congress” should the NPDES permit process as enacted truly prove 
unworkable in practice.233  Unfortunately, this is unrealistic, as the 
difficulty and reluctance to propose an amendment for the CWA will 
always serve as an obstacle. 
 230 Brief of the States of New York et al. as Amici Curiae, supra note 127, at 8 n.2.  
“If the dam context is determined to be factually indistinguishable from the facts of 
this case, however, it would become apparent that the dam cases were wrongly 
decided.”  Id. 
 231 Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 101. 
 232 Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico, supra note 171, 
at 2. 
 233 E. Assoc. Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 69 (2000) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
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It is also questionable whether the EPA could itself exempt its 
own categories of point sources from the CWA’s permit 
requirements.  The D.C. Circuit held in Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. v. Costle234  that: 
The wording of the statute, legislative history, and 
precedents are clear: the EPA Administrator does not have 
authority to exempt categories of point sources from the 
permit requirements of [Section] 402.  Courts may not 
manufacture for an agency a revisory power inconsistent 
with the clear intent of the relevant statute.235
The court noted that such a task was appropriate only for the 
legislature, rather than the judiciary, “where the public interest may 
be considered from the multifaceted points of view of the 
representational process.”236  More recently, the Ninth Circuit 
distinguished the EPA’s authority to define point and non-point 
sources from attempts to wholly exempt categories of point sources 
from NPDES permitting requirements.237  In League of Wilderness 
Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren,238 the court 
stated that although the EPA has the power to define point and non-
point source pollution “where there is room for reasonable 
interpretation of the statutory definition,” the EPA may not merely 
“exempt from NPDES permit requirements that which clearly meets 
the statutory definition of a point source by ‘defining’ it as a non-
point source.  Allowing the EPA to contravene the intent of Congress, 
by simply substituting the word ‘define’ for the word ‘exempt,’ would 
turn Costle on its head.”239
What the Costle court did concede was the necessary flexibility in 
the conditioning of permits, so long as the conditions were not 
inconsistent with the express terms of the CWA.240  Since the EPA 
could not exempt categories of point sources, the court suggested the 
use of general permits as devices to mitigate the overwhelming 
burden of issuing thousands of new permits, while accommodating 
 
 234 NRDC v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. (citing Fed. Power Comm’n v. Texaco, Inc. 417 U.S. 380, 400 (1974)). 
 237 League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. 
Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1190 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Costle, 568 F.2d at 1382. 
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“Congress’ clear mandate that all point sources have permits.”241  This 
suggestion may now serve as one answer to the troubles associated 
with imposing NPDES permitting requirements upon water diversion 
facilities. 
While an applicant for an individual NPDES permit must 
provide information about, among other things, the point source 
itself, the nature of the pollutants to be discharged, and any water 
treatment system that will be used, general permits greatly reduce 
these administrative burdens by authorizing discharges from a 
category of point sources within a specified geographic area. 242  Once 
the EPA or a state agency issues such a permit, covered entities, in 
some cases, need take no further action to achieve compliance with 
the NPDES besides adhering to the permit conditions.243
The EPA often uses such general permits for the oil and gas 
industry.244  Also, the United States Army Corps of Engineers’ dredge 
and fill permitting program includes a “nationwide permit” which 
authorizes the discharge of dredged or fill material for small-scale 
projects that will have minimal harmful effects on the environment.245  
The State of Pennsylvania has advocated its use of general permits as 
a way to significantly save on both time and money for applicants, 
while still meeting the applicable provisions of the CWA and state 
laws.246  Pennsylvania uses general permits for categories such as 
concentrated animal feeding operations, stormwater associated 
construction activities, and municipal separate storm sewer systems.247  
These general permits are said to have eliminated a “litany of 
 
 241 Id. at 1381. The court noted the practical differences between general permits 
and exemptions: 
An exemption tends to become indefinite: the problem drops out of 
sight, into a pool of inertia, unlikely to be recalled in the absence of 
crisis or a strong political protagonist.  In contrast, the general or area 
permit approach forces the Agency to focus on the problems of specific 
regions and requires that the problems of the region be reconsidered 
at least every five years, the maximum duration of a permit. 
Id. at 1382. 
 242 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(b)(2)(v) (2003). 
 243 Id. 
 244 See Texas Oil & Gas Ass’n. v. EPA, 161 F.3d 923, 929 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 245 Keith Rizzardi, Regulating Watershed Restoration: Why the Perfect Permit is the Enemy 
of the Good Project, 27 NOVA. L. REV. 51, 71 (2002). 
 246 Kathleen A. McGinty, Pennsylvania’s Approach to Sustainable Development, 19 NAT. 
RES. & ENV’T 46, 49 (2004); see also Brief of Amici Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., supra note 193, at 16. 
 247 Brief of Amici Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., supra 
note 193, at 16. 
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problems” by minimizing paperwork and administrative burdens.248  
Even Florida’s Water Management District administers 
Environmental Resource Permitting programs that include general 
permits for minor projects such as road resurfacing, dock 
maintenance, mosquito control, underground cables, and utility 
infrastructure.249  Nevertheless, critics of general permits argue that 
they provide insufficient public review and unfair special treatment.250  
Although general permit programs may not necessarily solve all of 
the complex problems associated with regulating water diversion 
facilities, they may be a step towards finding an equitable solution to 
a testing dilemma. 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
It is easily understood that actively discharging a pollutant from 
a point source into a water of the United States without a permit 
almost always violates the CWA.  It is a more difficult question, 
however, “when water is not altered chemically, physically, 
biologically, or radiologically, by man, but is merely transported, by 
man, from one water body to another.”251  While this question may 
seem very philosophical and abstract to some, it is quite real and 
problematic for the multitude of facilities managing public water 
supply systems, flood control, and navigation.  Those in fear of ripple 
effects will continue to debate the issue, but such arguments will only 
be successful by falling on the ears of the legislature rather than the 
courts.  As Justice Stevens once stated, “[it] is not what a court thinks 
is generally appropriate to the regulatory process, it is what Congress 
intended.”252  Therefore, the ultimate resolution will inevitably reflect 
Congress’ clear intention under the CWA of restoring and 
maintaining the “chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation’s waters.”253
 
 248 Id. 
 249 Rizzardi, supra note 245, at 72. 
 250 Id. 
 251 Rosemary J. Beless, Miccosukee: Can The Mere Transport of Unaltered Water Violate 
the Clean Water Act?, 17 UTAH B.J. 12, 12 (2004). 
 252 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 (1977). 
 253 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000). 
